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INTRODUCTION 
This  volume of t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  c o n t a i n s  a  l i s t i n g  of t h e  s a f e t y  requi re-  
ments and g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  the space  s h u t  r l e  o r b i t e r  genera ted  dur ing  t h e  s tudy .  
S i m i l a r  r e q u i r e m e ~ t s  and g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  space  s h u t t l e  payloads, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
space  s t a t i o n ,  a r e  conta ined i n  Volume V. These volumes a r e  in tended f o r  use  
i n  performance s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  i n  Phases C and D of these  programs. 
The requi?.?ments and g u i d e l i n e s  presented  h e r e  a r e  s p e c i f i c  t o  t h e  haz- 
a rds  and emergencies analyzed i n  t h e  s tudy  t a s k s ,  and must n o t  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  
as a complete l i s t  of s a f e t y  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  t h e  va r ious  pro- 
grams. It is  hoped, however, t h a t  these  volumes can be ampl i f ied  a s  f u r t h e r  
s a f e t y  s t u d i e s  a r =  performed, s o  t h a t  even tua l ly  they w i l l  r e p r e s e n t  a complete 
sys  tem s a f e t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  covering t h e  s a f e t y  a s p e c t s  of a l l  miss ion  phases 
of each veh ic le .  
The requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  two s e c t i o n s .  Sec t ion  3.0 
con ta ins  the  requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  which must be implemented on t h e  
s h u t t l e  ( s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ,  s i n c e  t h e  s tudy  covers  s a f e t y  i n  
e a r t h  o r b i t  only) .  S e c t i o n  4.0 con ta ins  the  i; t e r f a c e  s a f e t y  requirements  
and g u i d e l i n e s  w i t h  t h e  space  s t a t i o n ,  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  and s o r t i e  pay- 
loads ;  i . e . ,  t he  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  which must be imposed on t h m e  
v e h i c l e s  i n  o rde r  t o  ensure  t h e  s a f e t y  of t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r .  The i n c l u s i o n  
of a  requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  v e h i c l e ,  say  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  must 
not  be taken as a d e c i s i o n  t h a t  the  requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e  m l i s t  be imple- 
mented by t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  program ( t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  i n  t h i s  case) ,  o r  
charged t o  t h a t  program. I t  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the  p rov i s ions  w i l l  p h y s i c a l l y  b e  
implemented on t h a t  v e h i c l e .  
The source  of these  requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  is Appendix B of  Volume 
11 of t h i s  r e p o r t ,  which con ta ins  t h e  hazardlemergency analyses  performed dur- 
i n g  t h e  s t u d y .  The wording of each requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e  recommended i n  
t h a t  volume is used verbat im i n  t h i s  volume. A minor excep t ion  occurs  i n  a  
few cases  when two o r  t h r e e  p r a c t i c a l l y  i d e n t i c a l  s t a t ements  i n  t h e  haza rd /  
emergency analyses  (e.g., one d e a l i n g  wi th  flammable, t o x i c  and c o r r o s i v e  
f l u i d s )  are combined i n t o  one  s ta tement  ( d e a l i n g  wi th  flauunable, t o x i c ,  o r  
c o r r o s i v e  f l u i d s ) .  T r a c e a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  hazardlemergency a n a l y s i s  of Appendix 
B of Volume I1 is provided f o r  each requirement and g u i d e l i n e  through two 
l e t t e r s  and a number o r  n u m b e r l l e t t e r  combination (e.g. ,  RP-1.2.004 o r  GD-1.b) 
s h o m  i n  parentheses  a f t e r  each requirement and g u i d e l i n e .  This  nunbering 
system, aa w e l l  as t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  and format used, a r e  desc r ibed  i n  t h e  follow- 
i n g  s e c t i o n s .  These are c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  t h e  d e f i d t i o n s  and methodology used 
i n  performing t h e  hazardlemergency analyses .  
S e c t i o n  5,0 d i s c u s s e s  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  the  requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  
i n  t h i s  volme.  A second p a r e n t h e s i s  a f t e r  c e r t a i n  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  
i n d i c a t e s  a c ross - re fe rence  t o  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  i n  S e c t i o n  5.0. 
1.1 REQUIRElIENTS AVC C'JIDELINES 
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The f i r s t  l e t t e r  i n  t h e  pa ren theses  a f t e r  each requirement and guide- 
l i n e  i n d i c a t e s  whether i t  is  a requirement (R) o r  a  gu ide l ine  (G). 
The d i f f e r ence  between a requirement and a gu ide l i ne  is a s  fol lows:  
o A requirement (R) i s  regarded a s  a  "must implement'' item from 
the  s a f e t y  po in t  of view. I t  e l im ina t e s  an apprec iab le  element 
of r i s k  from the  t o t a l  spectrum of r i s k s  a s soc i a t ed  wi th  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  hazard o r  emergency. I f  recommended, a  requirement 
i s  t he r e fo r e  no t  considered a s  an i tem t o  be  r e j e c t e d  f o r  c o s t ,  
weight o r  s i m i l a r  r eascns ,  s i n c e  it s i g n i f i c a n t l y  impacts s a f e t y .  
o A gu ide l i ne  (G) i s  regarded a s  a  "s t rongly  recommended" i t em 
from the  s a f e t y  po in t  of view, It dces no t  e l im ina t e  any appre- 
c i a b l e  element of  r i s k ,  al though i t  may reduce t he  occurrence 
o r  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e f f e c t s  of t he  hazard.  The i nc r ea se  i n  s a f e t y  
from a gu ide l i ne  i n  c e r t a i n  circumstances may no t  be  commensurate 
wi th  t h e  p e n a l t i e s  of implementing i t ,  and t he r e fo r e  it may be 
t raded o f f  aga in s t  c o s t ,  weight ,  e t c .  There i s ,  i n  a l l  c a se s ,  
a  s a f e t y  pena l ty  ( i n  t h e  form of  exposure t o  some a d d i t i o n a l  
r i s k )  whenever a  gu ide l i ne  is no t  implemented, and t h i s  must 
be recognized whenever such a dec i s i on  is taken. 
The requirements and gu ide l i ne s  which were genera ted  were c a r e f u l l y  
worded s o  as t o  s a t i s f y  t h r e e  c r i t e r i a  t h a t  were considered very important .  
These c r i t e r i a  a r e  t h a t  the  requirements and gu ide l i ne s  should : 
(a )  B e  v e r i f i a b l e  -- i .e . ,  i t  should be  p o s s i b l e  t o  unambiguously 
v e r i f y  whether each requirement o r  gu ide l i ne  has  been met 
i n  t h e  design o r  i n  t h e  planned opera t ions .  Ambiguous o r  
non-ver i f iable  words such a s  " t o  t h e  maximum e x t e n t  poss ib le"  
o r  "adequate" have t he r e fo r e  been avoided. 
(b)  Meet t h e  mathematician 's  "necessary bu t  s u f f i c i e n t "  c r i t e r i o n  -- 
i .e . ,  they should spec i fy  every condi t ion  t h a t  must b e  m e t  t o  
s a t i s f y  t h e  s a f e t y  o b j e c t i v e ,  b u t  they should no t  spec i fy  more 
than is requ i red  f o r  s a f e t y .  The lat ter  po in t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
important  s i n c e  t he  tendency is t o  select p a r t i c u l a r  des ign 
o r  ope ra t i ona l  s o l u t i r n s  which r e s t r i c t  the  des igner ' s  cho ice ,  
r a t h e r  than s t a t i n g  only t h e  requirement i n  genera l  terms. 
( c )  Be w r i t t e n  i n  p r e c i s e  and unambiguous language, s u i t a b l e  f o r  
l ncorpora t ion  i n t o  pre l iminary  requirements  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
f o r  Phases B o r  C. 
1.2 REMEDIAL OR PREVENTIVE 
The second l e t t e r  i n  t h e  parentheses a f t e r  each requirement o r  gu ide l i ne  
i n d i c a t e s  whether t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  requirement o r  gu ide l i ne  con t r i bu t e s  toward 
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prevent ing  (P) t h e  hazardlernergency , o r  toward remedying (R) the  s i t u a t i o n  
a f t e r  t h e  hazard o r  emergency has  occurred.  This  does no t  r e f e r  t o  whether 
-
o r  no t  t h e  requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e  p reven t s  i n j u r y  o r  damage fo l lowing the  
occurrence of the  hazard o r  emergency. 
1 .3  HAZARD/EMERGENCY ANALYSIS 
The p a r t i c u l a r  hazardlemergency a n a l y s i s  o r  ana lyses  which o r i g i n a t e d  
each p a r t i c u l a r  requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e ,  is  i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e  laumber o r  
n u m b e r l l e t t e r  combination i n  t h e  pa ren theses  fo l lowing each requirement o r  
g u i d e l i n e .  The r e f e r e n c e  i s  t o  Volume 11 of  t h i s  repor:, HazardIEmergency 
Analyses. The hazardlemergency analyses  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  numerical  o r d e r  i n  
t h a t  volume. A l e t t e r ,  such a s  i n  1 . B ,  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  requirement o r  
g u i d e l i n e  appears  i n  more than one hazardlernergency a n a l y s i s ;  such requ i re -  
ments and g u i d e l i n e s  a r e  l i s t e d  a l p h a b e t i c a l l y  by t h e  i d e n t i f y i n g  le t ter  i n  
Volume I1 a t  t h e  beginning of each s e c t i o n .  
1.4 HAZARD REDUCTION PRECEDENCE SEQUENCE 
The requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  were developed i n  t h e  hmard/emergency 
ana lyses  by us ing  t h e  hazard reduc t ion  sequence of OMSF S a f e t y  P r o j e c t  
D i r e c t i v e  SPD-1A. The sequence is expla ined i n  Volume 11, ~azard/Emergency 
Analyses,  i n  which i t  is used. The r e s u l t i n g  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  
f a l l  i n t o  f o u r  c a t e g o r i e s  as a r e s u l t  of t h i s ,  and they a r e  grouped t o g e t h e r  
i n  t h i s  volume i n t o  f o u r  s e c t i o n s ,  a s  fol lows:  
3.1 Design Requirements and Guidel ines  
3.2 S a f e t y  Devices 
3.3 Warning Devices 
3.4 Opera t ional  Procedures 
The four  s e c t i o n s  correspond t o  t h e  f i r s t  four  s t e p s  (Numbers 1-4) on 
t h e  hazard reduc t ion  precedence sequence ( see  Volume 11) .  Each of t h e  
above f o u r  s e c t i o n s  t h e r e f o r e  con ta ins  a l l  t h e  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  
which s a t i s f y  each of t h e  four  hazard  reduc t ion  precedence sequence s t e p s ,  
as i d e n t i f i e d  a g a i n s t  each requirement and g u i d e l i n e  i n  t h e  hazardlemergency 
ana lyses  i n  Volume 11. 
The i n t e r f a c e  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s ,  i n  Sec t ion  4.0 of  t h i s  
volume, have not been s e p a r a t e d  i n t o  t h i s  sequence because of t h e i r  r e l a t i v e l y  
small numbers. 
1 .5  RESIDUAL HAZARDS 
The l a s t  s t e ~  of  t h e  hazard reduc t ion  precedence sequence (No. 5) c a l l s  
f o r  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  a p a r t i c u l a r  hazard  as a r e s i d u a l  hazard.  Th i s  
occurs  when i n j u r y  o r  l o s s  of  personnel  o r  damage t o  o r  l o s s  of  equipment is  
s t i l l  p o s s i b l e  from t h i s  hazard o r  emergency even when t h e  recommended requ i re -  
ments and g u i d e l i n e s  have been implemented. 
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Residual  hazards were i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the  hazardlemergency ana lyses  i n  
Volume 11. These a r e  l i s t e d  i n  Secticjn 3.5 of t h i s  volume as  app l i c ab l e  
t o  t he  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r .  The number i n  parentheses  i d e n t i f i e d  the  hazard1 
emergency a n a l y s i s  i n  Volume 11. 
Some r e s i d u a l  hazards  a r e  des ignated  as accep tab le  r i s k s .  These a r e  
hazards o r  emergencies i n  which t h e  r i s k ,  a f t e r  implementing t he  recomended 
r e q u i r e ~ e n t s  and gu ide l i ne s ,  i s  smal l  enough t h a t  no f u r t h e r  a c t i o n  is  con- 
s i d e r e d  necessary.  
Other r e s i d u a l  hazards  are l abe l ed  wi th  t h e  term SRT Requi rewnts .  Th i s  
means t h a t  Support ing Research and Technology (SRT) requirements  t...;ve been 
i d e n t i f i e d  t o  a i d  i n  r e so lv ing  t he se  hazards.  These SRT r e q u i r e m e z ~ s  a r e  
descr ibed i n  Volume 11. 
The remaining r e s i d u a l  hazards  are des ignated  a s  unresolved s a f e t y  
i s sue s .  These a r e  hazards  o r  emergencies f o r  which t he  r e s i d u a l  r i s k  ( a f t e r  
implementing t he  recomended requirements  and gu ide l ines )  is n o t  accep tab le ,  
and f o r  which no adequate means f o r  r e so lv ing  the  i s s u e  (such a s  de f i n ing  
suppor t ing  resea rch  and technology requirements) has  been i d e n t i f i e d .  
Res idual  hazards which were i d e n t i f i e d  as accep tab le  r i s k s  and as 
r e s i d u a l  s a f e t y  i s s u e s  i n  t he  hazard/emergency ana lyses  (Volume 11) a r e  
i d e n t i f i e d  a s  such i n  Sec t ion  3.5. 
It is suggested t h a t  procedures should b e  se t  up i n  t he  coarse  o f  a 
program f o r  the  p e r i o d i c  review of r e s i d u a l  hazards .  D i f f e r en t  l e v e l s  o f  
management should be involved,  wi th  t h e  lowest  l e v e l  reviewing the  accep tab le  
r i s k s ,  and t h e  unresolved s a f e t y  i s s u e s  being e q o s e d  t o  t h e  h ighes t  manage- 
ment l e v e l .  
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2.0 BASELINE MODEL 
The base l ine  model considered i n  the analyses included the vehic les  
shown i n  Figure 1. 
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I n i t i a l  ana lys i s  was based 4n the i n t e g r a l  tank s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ,  but 
emphasis w a s  l a t e r  switched t o  the  drop tank o r b i t e r  as t h i s  concept dev ' ...y ed. 
The assumptions made were broad enouah t h a t  no r e s u l t s  were inva l ida ted  . 
t h i s  change. 
Shu t t l e  payloads considered included manned and unmanned s o r t i e  payloads 
( i . e . ,  a t tached t o  the  o r b i t e r ) ,  s a t e l l i t e s  del ivered t o  e a r t h  o r b i t ,  and 
p o t e n t i a l  upper s t a g e  veh ic les  used t o  d e l i v e r  unmanned payloads t o  o r b i t s  
beyond the  o r b i t e r ' s  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
Upper s t age  veh ic les  s p e c i f i c a l l y  considered included the  following: 
. Agena 
. Centaur 
. Trms tage  
. Burner I1 
. Apollo Service  Module 
. Orbit-to-Orbit S h u t t l e  (OOS)/Tug 
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These were considered as t y p i c a l  of p o t e n t i a l  upper s tage  veh ic les  i n  
order  t o  i d e n t i f y  p o t e n t i a l  hazards. They were only considered as they 
operated i n  o r  near the  o r b i t e r  while i n  e a r t h  o r b i t .  
A t yp i ca l  s h u t t l e  mission, generated from NR Phase B s h u t t l e  d a t a ,  is 
shown i n  Fig. 2. The 5oxed a rea  shows the  mission phases considered i n  the  
study.  Only p o t e n t i a l  hazards occurring i n  these  on-orbit p h n ~ e s  have been 
considered. S o r t i e  modules, s a t e l l i t e s  and upper s t age  veh ic les  vere  
considered and hazards i d e n t i f i e d  only while these veh ic les  were t ranspor ted 
in o r b i t ,  deployed and r e t r i eved  by the  o r b i t e r ,  o r  operated i n  t he  v i c i n i t y  
of t he  o r b i t e r .  
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Figure 2. Typical  S h u t t l e  Mission 
The epace s t a t i o n s  considered were modular s t b t i o n s  d e l i  ~ e r e d  t o  e a r t h  
o r b i t  and assembled by t h e  o r b i t e r .  I n i t i a l  6lnan v e r b a m  and growth vers ions  
with up t o  12 men, as defined i n  recent  Phase B e tud ie s ,  were s tudied.  Assembly 
of t h e  epace s t a t i o n ,  independent operat ion i n  e a r t h  o r b i t ,  and normal resupply 
by t h e  o r b i t e r  were considered. 
3.0 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
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This section contains safety requirements and guidelines developed 
from anaiyses of s p e c i f i c  safety i ssues .  The requirements and guidelines 
are grouped into  f i v e  sub-sect it.^, corresponding to  the f i v e  steps of 
the hazard reduction precedence yequence. These f i v e  sub-sections are: 
3 .1  Design Req ~irements and Guidelines 
3.2 Safety Devices 
3.3 Warning Dc vices  
3.4 Operational Procedures 
3 . 5  Residual Hazards 
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3.1 DESIGN REQUIREPfENTS A .  GUIDELINES 
Haz ardoiis Payloads 
3.1.1 Shu t t l e  hardware required f o r  abor t  s h a l l  be located remotely 
from the  cargo bay, o r  p ro tec ted  aga ins t  the  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  
of upper s t age  veh ic le  explosions which would not  cause primary 
s h u t t l e  s t r u c t u r e  f a i l u r e .  (RR-l.J, 1.1.001) (5.1) 
3.1.2 Always-open cargo bay vents  t o  space s h a l l  be provided on the  
s h u t t l e  which l i m i t  i n t e r n a l  cargo bay pressures  from upper 
s t a g e  veh ic le  leakage t o  t he  cargo bay allowable l i m i t s .  
(RR-i.~, 1.1.001) (5.2) 
3.1.3 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided on the  s h u t t l e  f o r  automatic 
cargo bay venting when t h e  always-open vents  a r e  inadequate, 
i n  order t o  i nc rease  the  allowable flow from i n s i d e  t o  ou ts ide  
and t o  p ro t ec t  aga ins t  re-entry inges t ion  through always-open 
vents.  (GR-LL, 1.1.001) (5.2) 
3.1.4 A l l  s h u t t l e  hardware contained i n  and near  t he  s h u t t l e  cargo 
bay s h a l l  be  capable of being func t iona l ly  i s o l a t e d  from those 
components necessary f o r  de-orbit ,  re-entry and landing s o  t h a t  
an accident  i n  the  cargo bay s h a l l  not  prevent s h u t t l e  abor t .  
(RR-1.N, 1.1.001) (5.1) 
3.1.5 Vented gases from the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay s h a l l  no t  be  allowed 
t o  flow pas t  t he  s h u t t l e  p rope l lan t  tanks. (RR-1.0, 1.1.001) 
3.1.6 Cargo bay sur face  mater ia l s  which may be exposed t o  leaking 
corrosive  f l u i d s  from payload s h a l l  be constructed o r  protected 
aga ins t  corrosion.  (GR-1.V, 1.1.006) (5.5) 
3.1.7 Always-open cargo bay vents  t o  space s h a l l  be provided on the  
o r b i t e r  which l i m i t  i n t e r n a l  cargo bay pressures  from the  
combustion products of a s i n g l e  upper s t a g e  veh ic le  reac t ion  
cont ro l  rocket  engine t o  t he  cargo bay allowable limits. 
(RR-1.1.007) 
3.1.8 The f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  f o r  t h e  up2er s t a g e  veh ic le  and o r b i t e r  
attachment point  s h a l l  be a t  l e a s t  equal t o  the normal 
o r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r e  f a c t o r s  of s a f e ty .  (GP-1.1.008 ) 
3.1.9 The upper s t age  veh ic le  s h a l l  be  supported i n  the  o r b i t e r  s o  
t h a t  f a i l u r e  of any one s t r u c t u r a l  support member w i l l  not  
jeopardize support  of the  upper s t a g e  veh ic le  during r e t u r n  
t o  ea r th .  (RP-1 .. 1.008) 
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3.1.10 The upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  s h a l l  be extended and re leased  ou t s i de  of 
the cargo bay such t h a t  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  r o t a t i o n  about any 
one attachment po in t  o r  about i t s  cen t e r  of g r a v i t y  i n  any 
d i r e c t i o n  upon r e l e a s e ,  w i l l  n o t  impact any p a r t  of t he  o r b i t e r .  
(RR-1.W, 1.1009) (5 -3)  
3.1.11 No torques  s h a l l  be imparted t o  the  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  by t h e  
s epa ra t i on  mechanism. (GP-1.1. 009) 
3.1.12 Redundancy s h a l l  be  provided i n  t h e  means f o r  s epa ra t i ng  the  
upper s t a g e  veh i c l e .  No s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  s h a l l  r e s u l t  i n  un- 
programmed motion of the  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e .  (RP-1.I.010) 
3.1.13 O r b i t e r  t o  upper s t a g ?  veh i c l e  connections s h a l l  be designed 
f o r  emergency manual r e l e a s e  by o r b i t e r  crew member i n  ex t r a -  
veh i cu l a r  a c t i v i t y  . (RR-1.1. 010) (5.4) 
3.1.14 Emergency r e l e a s e  of the  extens ion mechanism s h a l l  be  pos s ib l e  
i n  o rder  t o  save  the  o r b i t e r  at  the  expense of the  upper s t a g e  
veh i c l e .  (RR-1.1.010) 
3.1.15 A backup means s h a l l  be  provided f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t o  vent  
o r  p r e s su r i z e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  wi th  a p r e s su re  s t a b i l i z e d  
s t r u c t u r e .  (RP-1.1.012) (5.6) 
3.1.16 The suppor t  s t r u c t u r e  of  a p ressure  s t a b i l i z e d  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  
i n  the  s h u t t l e  s h a l l  al low s h u t t l e  de-orbi t ,  re-entry and landing 
fol lowing l o s s  of p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  i n  t h e  upper s t e g e  veh i c l e  whi le  
i n  t he  o r b i t e r  cargo bay i n  o r b i t .  (GR-1.1.012) 
3.1.17 A backup means of dumping p r o p e l l a n t s  and p r e s su ran t s  from a 
r e t r i e v e d  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  s h a l l  be  ava i l ab l e .  (RP-1.1.013) 
3.1.18 The o r b i t e r  s h a l l  have t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  de-orbi t ,  re -enter  and 
land wi th  a f u l l y  loaded upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  as payload. 
( - 1 . 1 . 0 1 4 )  (5.7j  
3.1.19 Means s h a l l  b e  provided f o r  re-opening t he  cargo bay doors from 
any pa r  t i a l l y  c losed pos i t i on .  (RR-1.1.015) 
3.1.20 Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided t o  purge o r  vent  the  o r b i t e r  a i r l o c k  
and tunnel  t o  space  fol lowing emergency e g r e s s  o f  passengers from 
a t o x i c  payload environment, o r  fo l lowing IVA personnel  e n t r y  f o r  
i n spec t i on  and subsequent r e t u r n  t o  prevent  the  t o x i c  environment 
from contaminating the  o r b i t e r  crew and passenger compartment. 
(RP-lee ,  1.2.001) 
3.1.21 Emergency c a ~  3 b i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  provided i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  purge 
t h e  o r b i t e r  p ressur ized  volumes of  a t o x i c  environment t h a t  may 
r e s u l t  from t o x i c  contamination of  a payload, and t o  s u s t a i n  
o r b i t e r  personnel  dur ing  the  purging opera t ion .  (RP-1.2.001) 
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3.1.22 The o r b i t e r  ca:-go bay s h a l l  be vented t o  space o r  t he  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay doors s h a l l  be opened a t  a l l  times while on-orbit t o  
preclude buildup of pressures  i n  the  cargo bay of support ing 
combustion. (RP-1.2.002) (5.10) 
3.1.28 I g n i t i o n  sources .'_n the  o r b i t e r  bay, such a s  switches and r e l a y s ,  
s h a l l  be  seayed o r  otherwise contained s o  as t o  prevent i g n i t i o n  
of f lauunable f l u i d s ,  (RP-1.n , 1.2.002) 
3.1.29 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  i s o l a t e  o r b i t e r  environmental 
con t ro l  system from payload t o  prevent t ox i c  fumes from en te r ing  
the  o r b i t e r .  (RR-1.2.003) 
3.1.30 Access f o r  v i sua l  i aspec t ion  by in t r aveh icu la r  a c t i v i t y  o r  
remotely by ins t rumentat ion s h a l l  be provided t o  a l l  primary 
s t r u c t u r e  i n s i d e  the  cargo bay o r  equipment i n  the  cargo bay 
required f o r  r e t u r n  t o  ea r th .  (GR-1.2.004) 
3.1.23 Capabi l i ty  t o  r e l ea se ,  e j e c t ,  o r  extend che payload s h a l l  be  
provided .JO as t o  prevent damage t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  a t  the  expense 
of t he  p&yload. (RR-l.h, 1.2002) 
3.1.24 Capabilf tg s h a l l  be provided f o r  t he  o r b i t e r  crew t o  venL and 
dump pr2ssur ized,  flammable o r  hazardous payload f l u i d s  t o  space 
wi th in  t t e  iie cons t r a in t s  imposed by an abo r t  s i t u a t i o n .  This 
c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  ava i l ab l e  wi th  t he  cargo bay doors open o r  
close3,  (k t - l . i ,  1.2.002) 
3.1.25 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided t o  switch o f f  a l l  e l e c t r i c a l  loads 
t o  payload from t h e  o r b i t e r ,  (RP-1.J, 1.2002) 
3.1.26 Thermal i n s u l a t i o n  s h a l l  be provided between o r b i t e r  cargo bay/ 
payload a t t ach  p c i n t s  and o ther  physical  i n t e r f a c e s  t o  minimize 
thermal conduction t o  o r b i t e r  struct31ie.  (RP-1.1, 1.2002) 
3.1.27 F i r e  and hea t  r e s i s t a n t  p ro tec t ion  of o r b i t e r  t o  payload command 
and ins t rumentat ion i n t e r f a c e s  s h a l l  be  provided, (RP-1.m , 1.2002) (5 e l l )  
3.1.31 Vented gases from the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay s h a l l  not  be  allowed 
t o  flow pas t  the o r b i t e r  p rope l lan t  tanks.  (RR-1.0, 1.1.001) (5 - 5 )  
3.l.32 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided t o  purge o r  kcnt the  o r b i t e r  
c l r l ock  and tunnel  space following emergency egress  of pass- 
engers from a corrosive  payload environment, o r  following IVA 
personnel en t ry  f o r  inspec t ion  and subsequent r e t u r n  t o  prevent 
the  corrosive  environment from contaminating the  o r b i t e r  crew 
and passengel compartment . (RF-1 e , 1 2 , 001) 
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3.1.33 O r b i t e r  hardware required  f o r  abor t  s h a l l  be l oca t ed  remotely 
from t h e  cargo bay, o r  p ro tec ted  aga in s t  t he  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  
of payload explos ions  which would not  cause primary s h u t t l e  
s t r u c t u r e  f a i l u r e .  (RR-1.2.005) 
3.1.34 Always-open cargo bay vents  t o  space  s h a l l  be provided on t he  
o r b i t e r  which limit i n t e r n a l  cargo bay p ressures  from leakage 
t o  t h e  cargo bay al lowable l i m i t s .  (RR-1.2.005) 
3.1.35 Cargo s h a l l  be p a c k a ~ e d  dur ing t r a n s f e r  s o  a s  t o  have no exposed 
sharp  edges o r  corners .  (RR-1.3.004) 
3.1.36 Crew con t ro l l ed  cargo t r a n s f e r  v e l o c i t y  s h a l l  b e  l im i t ed  s o  
t h a t  t h e  cargo can a t  a l l  t imes be stopped w i th in  the  v i s i b l e  
range. (RP-1.3.004) 
3.1.37 Cargo beyond t h e  l i m i t s  allowed f o r  hand t r a n s f e r  s h a l l  be 
t r a n s f e r r e a  on guide r a i l s  o r  o t h e r  mechanisms which p o s i t i v e l y  
cons t r a in  t h e  angular  and l i n e a r  motion of the  cargo except  i n  
t he  d i r e c t i o n  of motion. (RP-1.3.004) 
3.1.38 Cargo handl ing mechanisms s h a l l  al low f o r  s toppage o f  the  motion, 
r e v e r s a l  of  t h e  motion, o r  r e l e a s e  of t h e  cargo a t  any po in t  
along the  t r a n s f e r  pa th .  (RP-l.dd, 1.3.002) 
3.1.39 Cargo handl ing mechanisms s h a l l  be  designed t o  wi ths tand  t h e  
p ropu ls ive  fo r ce s  t h a t  would r e s u l t  from a l eak ing  o r  ruptured 
f l u i d  cargo. (RR-l.hh, 1.3.002) 
3.1.40 The r e f l e c t a n c e  of su r f ace s  on docking veh i c l e s  and t he  docking 
system t h a t  a r e  v i s i b l e  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l l i n g  crew and T.V. cameras 
s h a l l  be beluw eye and vid :con damage l e v e l s .  (RP-2.1.001) 
3.1.41 The vid icon tubes f o r  docking s h a l l  be  designed f o r  low s e n s i t i v i t y  
t o  t ube  image burn. (GP-2.1.001) 
3.1.42 Redundant o r  r ep laceab le  l i g h t i n g  p rov i s ions  s h a l l  be provided f o r  
docking. (RP-2.1.001) 
3.1.43 Redundant o r  r ep laceab le  v id icon tubes s h a l l  be provided f o r  docking. 
(RR-2.1 .OOI.) 
3.1.44 Redundant o r  r ep laceab le  video monitors  s h a l l  be  provided. 
(RR-2.1.001) 
3.1.45 The r e a c t i o n  jet con t ro l  system s h a l l  provide  redundancy t o  prec lude  
"jet s t uck  o f f "  cond i t ions .  (RP-2.A, 2.1.002) 
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The rate command and r a t e l a t t i t u d e  feedback loops of t h e  r o t a t i o n a l  
con t ro l  system s h a l l  provide  redundancy t o  prec lude  "open loop" 
f a i l u r e s .  (RP-2.B, 2.1.002) 
The t r a n s l a t i o n a l  command c i r c u i t s  s h a l l  provide redundancy t o  pre- 
c lude  "open c i r c u i t "  f a i l u r e s .  (RP-2.1.002) 
The docking system s h a l l  be designed t o  ope ra t e  w i t h  continuous 
command of t h e  c o n t r o l  system i n  t h e  even t  t h a t  minimum impulse 
command has  been l o s t .  (RR-2.1.002) 
Docking system rap id  emergency r e l e a s e  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided. 
(RR-2.1. 003) 
The docking system s h a l l  be designed t o  wi ths tand normal j ackkn i f ing  
v e h i c l e  dynamics and w i l l  l i m i t  a t t i t u d e  excurs ions  t o  w i th in  pre- 
s c r i bed  l i m i t s  a s  determined by v e h i c l e  geometry t o  prevent  inad- 
v e r t e n t  veh i c l e  con tac t .  (RR-2.1.003) 
The docking system s h a l l  be capable of wi ths tanding v e h i c l e  o s c i l l a -  
t i o n  and loads  genera ted  by inadver ten t  a t t i t u d e  con t ro l  system 
a c t i v i t y  of e i t h z r  o r  both  veh i c l e s  dur ing draw down t o  r i g i d i z e  t he  
cap tu re  i n t e r f a c e .  (RR-2.1.004) 
Thermal p r o t e c t i o n  s h a l l  be provided t o  prevent  jet plume impingement 
damage from docking v e h i c l e s  w i th in  t h e  design angular  and l i n e a r  
misalignments . (RR-2.1.004) 
Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided t o  r e cyc l e  bo th  cap tu re  and s e a l  l a t c h e s  
on t he  docking system from any phase of t h e i r  s t a t u s .  (RR-2.1.005) 
T rans l a t i on  a c c e l e r a t i o n  comand minimum impulse c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  
provided t o  permit  s t a t i o n  keeping d r i f t  t o  a minimum and reduce 
a t t e n u a t i o n  requirements.  (GP-2.1.005) 
Bore s i g h t  alignment of  video o r  d i r e c t  v i s u a l  view w i t h  t he  cen t e r  
l i n e  o r  t h e  docking i n t e r f a c e  from a po in t  n o t  g r e a t e r  than 2.0 - 
meters from t h e  docking plane  s h a l l  be provided t o  reduce con tac t  
misalignment. (GP-2.1.005) 
Docking p o r t  environmental covers s h a l l  be  deployed and n o t  
j e t t i s o n e d .  (RP-2.1.005) 
P o s i t i v e  means f o r  j e t t i s o n i n g  t h e  payload module s h a l l  be  provided 
i n  the even t  of a f a i l u r e  of t h e  payload deployment mechanism. 
(RR-2.1.006) 
Guidera i l s  o r  similar dev ices  s h a l l  5e provided t o  reven t  r e con t ac t  
between payload module and cargo bay i n  t h e  event  OF deployment 
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3.1.59 P o s i t i v e  means f o r  j e t t i s o n i n g  o r  co l l ap s ing  payload deployment 
mechanism s h a l l  be provided i f  mechanism w i l l  a t  any po in t  i n  the  
deployment o b s t r u c t  t h e  c lo su re  of t h e  cargo bay doors.  (RR-2.1.006) 
3.1.60 A l l  hardware i n  the  docking tunne l  w i l l  be f l u sh  mounted t o  i n t e r i o r  
wa l l s  of the  cargolcrew t r a n s f e r  tunnel .  (RP-2 .l.OO7) 
3.1.61 Emergency l i f e  suppor t  p rov i s ions  s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  t o  the  docking 
crew dur ing docking opera t ions  (RP-2.1.009) 
3.1.62 Stops s h a l l  be provided on ha tches  t o  prevent  uncontrol led  opening 
i f  opened when a p ressure  d i f  ferent ia3 .  e x i s t s .  (RP-2.1.010) 
3.1.63 A l l  docking i n t e r f a c e  equipment s h a l l  be grounded. (RR-2.1.011) 
3.1.64 E l e c t r i c a l  umbi l i ca l s  s h a l l  be grounded u n t i l  connection of t he  
docking i n t e r f a c e .  (RR-2 .1.011) 
3.1.65 Thermal b lanke t  temperatu-e con t ro l  of hydrau l i c  components s h a l l  
provide  proper ope ra t i ng  temperature.  (RP-2.2.002) 
3.1.66 Redundant j o i n t  motor power supply c i r c u i t s  s h a l l  be provided on 
manipula tors .  (GP-2.4.003) 
3.1.67 Two o r  more manipula tors  s h a l l  be provided i n  a manipulator  docking 
system. Each manipulator  s h a l l  be capable of  performing docking by 
i t s e l f ,  and s h a l l  a l s o  be capable  of cont inuing any docking func t ion  
i n  -:he even t  of  a f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  o the r  manipulator  a t  any s t a g e  of the  
docking. (RR-2.4.003) 
3.1.68 An emergency j e t t i s o n i n g  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided f o r  manipu- 
l a t o r s ,  independent of  the  normal manipulator  system. This  s h a l l  
be capable of j e t t i s o n i n g  t h e  manipulator  and conf igur ing t h e  
o r b i t e r  f o r  r e en t ry  and landing fo l lowing a f a i l u r e  o r  acc iden t  
which does n o t  a l low stowage of t h e  manipulator ,  (RR-2.4.003) 
3.1.69 Redundant c o n t r o l  feedback loops  s h a l l  be provided each a x i s  of 
computer a ided c o n t r o l  f o r  t he  manipulator .  (RP-2.4.004) 
3.1.70 The manipulator  computer aided c o n t r o l  system s h a l l  f a i l  t o  t h e  %o 
command" mode. (GR-2.4.004) 
3.1.71 Manual ove r r i de  of  computer a ided manipulator  c o n t r o l  s h a l l  be  
provided. (RR-2.4 .OO4) 
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On-Board Surv ivab i l i t y  
Normally hab i t ab l e  compartments of more than 25 m3 (880 f t 3 )  i n  
volume s h a l l  have two o r  more e x i t s  i n t o  a reas  which provide f o r  
personnel surv iva l .  These e x i t s  s h a l l  be a t  l e a s t  3 m (10 f t )  
apa r t .  (RR-3.C, 3.1.001) 
Flammable, explosive  o r  gas generat ing mater ia l  s h a l l  be located 
s o  t h a t  t he  energy content which can be propagated a t  any one 
loca t ion  s h a l l  not  r e s u l t  i n  overpressur iza t ion  of the  compart- 
ment from hea t  and gas production. (RR-3.D, 3.1.001) 
Flammable, explosive  o r  gas generating mater ia l  wi th in  3 m (10 f t )  
of the entrance t o  compartments with only one .en t ry /egress  path 
s h a l l  be l imi ted  s o  t h a t  t he  energy content ,  i f  re leased ,  w i l l .  not  
r e s u l t  i n  damage o r  an environment which prevents s h i r t s l e e v e  access 
through the  entrance.  (RR-3. E ,  3.1.001) 
Emergency c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided on o r b i t e r  f l i g h t s  wi th  a 
manned s o r t i e  module f o r  the r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  of a l l  the  passengers 
i n  the  o r b i t e r ,  without support  from the  s o r t i e  module. (RR-3.G, 3.1.002) 
Orb i t e r  equipment required f o r  re turn ing  the  o r b i t e r  t o  e a r t h  s h a l l  
be capable of operat ing i n  a depressurized environment. The con- 
t r o l s  f o r  t h i s  equipme?lt s h a l l  be operabie by crewmen i n  pressure  
s u i t s .  (RR-3.1, 3.1.004) 
A backup EVA eg res s l i ng re s s  hatch which can be used f o r  contingency 
EVA s h a l l  be ava i lab le .  Capabi l i ty  f o r  depressur izat ion and repress-  
u r i za t ion  of t he  connectirg compar~ment/module s h a l l  be provided. 
(RR-3.J, 3.1.008) 
The o r b i t e r  s h a l l  be divided i n t o  two o r  more compartments which 
can be rap id ly  sea led  o f f  i n  an emergency t o  prevent the ingress  
of flames and contaminated atmosphere from the  other  compartment ( s )  . 
Each of these compartments s h a l l  be  capable of accommodating a l l  
on-board o r b i t e r  personnel u n t i l  t he  f i r e  and/or t ox i c  environment 
can be e l iminated and a hab i t ab l e  environment res tored .  (RR-3.1.001) 
Two o r  more en t rances  i n t o  normally hab i tab le  compartments of 
more than 25 m3 (860 f t 3 )  i n  volume s h a l l  be s h i r t s l e e v e  
acces s ib l e  from each of the  o the r  normally inhabi ted compart- 
ments. These entrances  s h a l l  be  a t  l e a s t  3 m (10 f t )  apar t .  
(RR-3.1.002) 
Where only one s h i r t s l e e v e  ingress /egress  path is provided i n t o  a 
compartment o r  module, redundant means s h a l l  be ava i l ab l e  f o r  
opening the  connecting hatch(es)  from e i t h e r  s ide .  (RR-3.1.005) 
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3.1.81 i n e  spac.? s t a t i o n  s hall be conf igured  s o  that i t  always has  a t  l e a s t  
two dacking p o r t s  a v a i l c l e  which can ac~onmoda te  a s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  
resupply  o r  r e scue  mission.  (KR-3.1 .One) 
3.1.82: Emergency l i f e  st:pport c a p a b i l i t y  s h ~ l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  on t h e  space  
s t a t i o n  f dilt?wiCg t h e  non , . r r r iv . i l  o f  t h e  nex t  planned o r 5 i t e r  u n t i l  
t h e  f c l l o c i n g  resupply  o r  r e scue  o r b i t e r  f l i g h t .  (RR-3.1.006) 
@A!! Space Division North Amercan Rocltwell 
3.2 SAFETY DEVICES 
Hazardous Payloads 
3.2.1 Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t o  vent  and 
dump upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  p r e s su r i z ed  o r  hazardous f l u i d s  t o  
space  w i th in  the  time c o n s t r a i n t s  imposed by an abor t  s i t u a t i o n .  
Th i s  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  wi th  t h e  cargo bay doors 
open o r  closed.  (RP-1.G, 1.1.001) (5.7) 
3.2.2 O r b i t e r  equipment and s t r u c t u r e  exposed t o  vented gases from 
the  cargo bay s h a l l  be p ro t ec t ed  aga in s t  the  e f f e c t s  of  cor ros ion  
and be capable of i n spec t i on  on the  ground. ( 1  1 . 1 0 1  (5.1,5.5) 
3.2.3 I n t e r l o c k s ,  redundancy, grounding and i s o l a t i o n  devices  s h a l l  
be  provided on exp los ive  charges s o  t h a t  no s i n g l e  d e t e c t a b l e  
f a i l u r e  o r  combination of undetec table  f a i l u r e s  s h a l l  r e s u l t  
i n  premature detonat ion.  (RP-1.1.003) 
3.2.4 A restraint system s h a l l  be provided f ~ r  t he upper s t a g e  veh i c l e s  
i n  the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay which prevents  contac t  of the  veh i c l e  
wi th  b r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r e  o r  equipment i n  the  event  of p a r t i a l  o r  
t o t a l  r e l e a s e  of the  attachment po in t s .  (PP-1.1.008) 
3.2.5 Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t o  s e l e c t i v e l y  
p r e s s u r i z e  o r  vent  each tank of an upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  using a 
common buikhead. The c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e  wi th  che 
o r b i t e r  cargo bay doors open o r  closed.  (RP-1.1.011) (5.12) 
3.2.6 Automatic means s h a l l  be  provided f o r  de t ec t i ng  i n t e r f e r e n c e s  
by t h e  payload w i th  t he  c lo s ing  of t he  cargo bay doors and 
s toppinq t h e  motion be fore  damage r e s u l t s  t o  the  doors ox the  
door mechanism. (RR-1.1.015) 
3.2.7 Capabi l i t ;  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  v i s u a l  i n spec t i on  of an o r b i t e r  
pay loa i  i n  the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay wi th  t he  cargo bay doors 
open. (RP-1.1.015) 
3.2.8 Capab i l i t y  f o r  ex t ra -veh icu la r  a c t i l t i t y  s h a l l  be provided t o  
disconne-t , Fever,  o r  o therwise  f r e e  cab les ,  deployed mechanisms 
o r  o the r  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  p ro t rube ranc t s  which could i n t e r f e r e  
wi th  r e t r i e v a l  and stowage i n  t he  o r b i t e r ,  (RP-1.1 .Ol!P 
3.2.9 Means s h a l l  be provided t o  decontaminate personnel  who have been 
exposed t o  a t o x i c  o r  cor ros ive  environment i n  the  payload which 
can b e  propagated t o  t he  o r b i t e r  be fo r e  e n t e r i n g  the  o r b i t e r  
crew and passenger compartments. (RR-1. f , 1.2.001) 
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M-.nually and r m o t e l y  c o n t r o l l e d  means s h a l l  be provided i n  
press:lpi zed x d i t e r  payloads f o ~  c o n t r o l l i n g  and ex t ingu i sh ing  
f i r e s .  (W-1.1.003) 
Means e h s l l  be provided f o r  tt;: l o c a l  : ;pp l i ca t ion  of r a d i a n t  o r  
o t h e r  typL: o i  h e a ~  remotely o r  by personnel  i n  I V A  o r  EVA 
a c t i v i t y  t o  evapora te  accuxu la t ions  of f rozen f l u i d s  from 
c ~ i  t i c a l  a r e a s .  ('iR-1.2. q04) (5 -13) 
Carg. of more thm: 4.5 kg (iO0 l b )  mass, o r  hazardous cargo 
s h ~ l l  be t e t h e r e d  a t  ail t imes dur ing  handl ing  and t r a n s f e r  
ir. p r e ~ s u r i z e d  a r e a s  e i t h e r  t o  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  s t r u c t u r e  o r  t o  
the t r a n ~ f a -  mechanism s o  a s  t o  l i m i t  t h e  p o s s i b l e  t r a v e l  of 
t h e  cardo fol lowing a  r i l u r e  of tne primary cargo c t t a c h  
mcchanism. (RR-1.3.004) (5.14) 
Automatic and/or  crew c o n t r o l l e d  emergency means s h a l l  be 
provided f o r  s h u t t i n g  o f f  power and a r r e s t i n g  the  motion 
of cargo t r a n s f e r  mechanisms. (RR-1.3.004) 
Packzging of hand-carr ied cargo s h a l l  be  provided wi th  m u l t i p l e  
hmdholds  , s h a l l  a l low forward v i s i b ~ l i  t y  by t h e  c o n t r o l l i n g  
personnel ,  and s h a l l  be  capable o f  s u r v i v i n g  impact a g a i n s t  
a  sha rp  o b j e c t  a t  3 m/sec (10 f t / s e c )  . (RP-1. aa ,  1.3.001) 
P rov i s ions  s h s l l  be made f o r  r a p i + l y  secur ing  hand-carr ied 
cargo t o  va r ious  s t r u c t u r a l  p o i n t s  along the  t r a n s f e r  pa th  s o  
a s  t o  p reven t  l o s s  of c o n t r o l  of t h e  cargo i n  the  event of 
an emergency. (KP-1. bb, 1.3.001) 
Docking 
biindow, v id icon ,  and EVA v i s o r  f i l t r r s  s h a l l  be ~ r o v i d e d  t o  p r o t e c t  
eyes  and camera from docking laser l i g h t  damage. (RP-2.1.001) 
I n h i b i t  c a p a b i l i t v  s h a l l  be provided t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  " j e t  s t u c k  on" 
cond i t ion .  (RR-2. C , 2.1.002) 
E i t h e r  manual and/or  redundant automatic  a t t i t u d e  hold  i n h i b i t  func- 
'ions s h a l l  be provided t o  the  a p p l i c ~ 5 l e  darking ~ e h i c l e  on ind ica -  
c ion  of capture .  (RP-2.1.004) 
Control  system i n h i b i t  swi tches   hall be  p ro tec ted  from i n a d v e r t e n t  
a c t i v a t i o n  o r  d e a c t i v a t i o n .  (W-2.1 .OO4) 
Docking l a t c h i n g  systems r e c y c l e  swi tches  s h a l l  be p r o t e c t e d  from 
i n a d v e r t e n t  a c t i v a t i o n .  (RP-2.1.005) 
Stowage o r  t i e  down shall be provided f o r  crew and c r i t i c a l  equipment 
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3.2.22 Means s h a l l  be provided t o  equa l i z e  p ressures  on both s i d e s  of a 
hatch  before  opening i t .  (RP-2 .i.010) 
3.2.23 C i r c u i t  breaker  p ro t ec t i on  of  a l l  i n t e r f a c e  instrv.rnentation s h a l l  be 
provided. (RR-2.1.011) 
3.2.24 Control  feedback loops  s h a l l  be provided on each manipulator  j o i n t  
c o n t r o l  which l i m i t  no t ion  when excess ive  fo r ce s  o r  torques a r e  ex- 
perienced.  (RR-2.4.003) 
3.2.25 A r m  j o i n t  on manipulators  s h a l l  be designed t o  lock on i n d i c a t i o n  o f  
j o i n t  con t ro l  o r  motor f a i l u r e .  The lock s h a l l  incorpora te  a b l i p  
c l u t ch  c a p e b i l i t y  t o  prevent  s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e s .  (RR-2.4.003) 
3.2.26 E l e c t r i c a l  a r  mechanical s t ops  s h a l l  be provided t o  prevent  the  
manipulator  from being d r iven  i n t o  s u r f a c e s  of i t s  own veh i c l e .  
(GR-2.4.003) 
On-Board S u r v i v a b i l i t y  
-- 
3.2.27 Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided t o  reduce the p ressure  -h each compart- 
ment s u f f i c i e n t l y  , o r  i nc r ea se  i t  i n  t h e  ad jo in ing  compartment (8) 
hnd t o  cu t  o f f  a i r  c i r c u l a t i o n ,  s o  t h a t  in an emergency t he  atmosphere 
i n  t he  a f f e c t e d  compartment w i l l  no t  be propagated i n t o  ad jo in ing  
compartments. Th i s  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  con t ro l l ed  remotely from 
each compartment. (RR-3.A, 3.1.001) 
3.2.28 Automatic ven t ing  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided i n  each compartment 
s o  t h a t  i n  thc  event  of a f i r e  o r  r e l e a s e  b>f  gases  w i th in  t h e  
compartment t h z  p ressure  w i l l  no t  exceed tLe a e r u c t u r a l  l i m i t s  of 
t he  s t r u c t u r e  o r  the  c a p a b i l i t y  of s e a l s  t u  o the r  comksrtments t o  
exclude the  contaminated atmosphere. (RR-3. B ,  3  .I. 001) 
3.2.29 Pressure  s u i t s  and a t t endan t  l i f e  suppor t  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  the  
o r b i t e r  crew on every  f l j  ght .  (RR-3.1.004) 
3.2.30 Pressure  s u i t s  and a t t endan t  l i f e  suppor t  s h a l l  be provided f o r  a l i  
orb1 t e r / s o r t i e  module passengers on missions where the conf igura t ion  
does no t  provide two s e p a r a t e  p r e s su r i z ab l e  compartments capable of 
re t u rn i ag  a l l  passengers t o  e a r t h .  (RR-3.1 .OO4) 
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3.3 WALYING DEVICES 
Hazardous Payloads 
3.3.1 Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  d e t e c t  p o t e n t i a l  tank f a i l u r e s  
by measurement of f l u i d  p r e s s u r e s ,  temperatures,  tank s t r a i n s ,  
o r  o t h e r  means. (RF-J..F, 1.1.001) 
3.3.2 Cargo bay p ressure  and s e l e c t e d  w a l l  temperatures s h a l l  be 
monitored. (GR-1.S, 1.1.002) 
3 . 3 . 3  Upper s t a g e  veh ic le  monopropellant temperatures and p r e s s u r e s  
s h a l l  be monitored. (RR-1.1.004) (5 .l5) 
3.3.4 Means s h a l l  be  provided t o  i n d i c a t e  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t h a t  
a r e t r i e v e d  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  is p o s i t i v e l y  secured  a t  a l l  
a t t ached  p o i n t s  p r i o r  t o  d e o r b i t  and r e e n t r y .  (RP-1.1.008) 
3.3.5 For upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  wi th  propuls ion  tanks  us ing  common 
bulkheads, d i f f e r e n t i a l  p r e s s u r e  between the  two t anks ,  
common bulkhead s t r a i n ,  o r  o t h e r  i n d i c a t i o n s  of p o t e n t i a l  
f a i l u r e ,  s h a l l  be  monitored by t h e  o r b i t e r  crew. (RP-1.1.011) 
3.3.6 P o s i t i v e  i n d i c a t i o n  s h a l l  be provided t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t h a t  
a r e t r i e v e d  payload has  been p roper ly  secured  i n  the  cargo bay 
be fo re  c l o s i n g  t h e  cargo bay doors.  (RP-1.1.015) 
3.3.7 P o s i t i v e  i n d i c a t i o n  s h a l l  be provided t o  the  o r b i t e r  crew t h a t  
the  cargo bay doors have closed and l a t c h e d  be fo re  i n i t i a t i n g  
de-orbi t .  (RR-1.1.015) 
3.3.8 Means s h a l l  be provided f o r  determin:'-ng t h e  presence of an 
unacceptable t o x i c  environment i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  a s  a r e s u l t  of 
t o x i c  contamination i n  a payload. (W-1.2.001) (5.16) 
3.3.9 F i r e  d z t e c t i o n  and l o c a t i o n  s a ~ a b i l i t y  , such a s  d i s t r i b u t e d  
thermocouples, i n f r a r e d  d e t e c t o r s ,  o r  remote c o n t r o l  TV, s h a l l  
be  provided i n  t h e  cargo bay f o r  use  whi le  t h e  cargo bay docrs  
a r e  closed.  (RR-1.2.002) 
3.3.10 Means s h a l l  be  provided f o r  d e t e c t i n g  t h e  presence of a f i r e  i n  
p ressur ized  s h u t t l e  payloads. (RR-1.2.003) 
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockmell 
Docking 
P o s i t i v e ,  redundant i n d i c a t i o n  o f  docking cap tu re  l a t c h  s h a l l  be 
provided the  v e h i c l e  which is t o  i n h i b i t  i ts c o n t r o l  system. 
(RR-2.1.004) 
P o s i t i v e  i n d i c a t i o n  of  cargo bay door deployment and c l o s u r e  s h a l l  be 
provided. (RR-2.1 .OO5) 
P o s i t i v e  i n d i c a t i o n  of docking cap tu re  l a t c h  s t a t u s  s h a l l  be provided 
t o  a s su r e  they a r e  each (1)  armed, (2) t r i gge red ,  (3) engaged, and 
(4)  locked. (RR-2.1.005) 
P o s i t i v e ,  redudant i n d i c a t i o n  of  Gocking p o r t  s e a l  l a t c h  s t a t u s  s h a l l  
be provided t o  a s su r e  they a r e  each (1 )  armed, (2)  t r i gge red ,  (3) en- 
gaged, and (4)  locked p r i o r  t o  opening t r a n s f e r  tunnel .  (RR-2.1.005) 
Annunciator warning t o  a l l  personnei  s h a l l  be provided p r i o r  t o  
manned docking maneuvers. (RP-2.1.008) 
Means s h a l l  be provided t o  v e r i f y  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  a docking ha t ch  
s e a l  be fore  s e p a r a t i n g  a Cocked module o r  veh i c l e .  (RP-2 ,l. 010) 
P o s i t i v e  redundant i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  pneumatic a t t e n u a t i o n  system 
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Pre s su r i z ing  gas on upper s t a g e  c ? h i c l e s  s h a l l  be turned o f f  
u n t i l  immediately p r i o r  t o  r e l e a s e  of t he  veh i c l e  from the  
o r b i t e r .  ( R P - l . H ,  1.1.001) (5.17) 
Cargo bay doors s h a l l  be  open a t  a l l  t imes i n  e a r t h  o r b i t ,  
(GR-1.M, 1.1.001) (5.2) 
Liquid p rope l l an t s  of r e t r i e v e d  upper s t a g e  veh ic les  s h a l l  
be  dumped t o  space  be fore  i n i t i a t i o n  of the  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  
d e o r b i t  maneuver. (RP-1.Q, 1.1.001) 
Upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  propel la , .  - tank p ressures  sh?! 1 be reduced 
t o  the  minimum ope ra t i ng  value  be fo r e  r e t r i e v a l  i n t o  the  
o r b i t e r  cargo bay. (RP-1.R, 1.1.001) 
Crew procedures f o r  monopropellant durn? s h a l l  be provided i n  
case  of r ap id  r i s e  i n  p ressure  o r  temperature. (RR-1.1.004) (5.15) 
O r b i t e r  crew con t ro l  of upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  s h a l l  be  provided 
u n t i l  s epa r a t i on  from t h e  o r b i t e r  prec ludes  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
r econ tac t .  (RP-1.U, 1.1.005) (5.18) 
O r b i t e r  o r i e n t a t i o n  s h a l l  po in t  the  l o n g i t u d i n a l  a x i s  toward 
t h e  separa ted  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  u n t i l  a s a f e  s epa ra t i on  
d i s t a n c e  has been achieved. (RR-1.1.005 ) (5 -18) 
Procedures s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  t o  apply u n i d i r e c t i o n a l  t r a n s l a -  
t i o n a l  o r  r o t a t i o n a l  a c c e l e r a t i o n  t o  t he  o r b i t e r  i n  the  event  
of  a p a r t i a l  o r  t o t a l  release of the  payload i n  t he  cargo bay 
u n t i l  loose  p a r t s  and t h e  payload have s e t t l e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
t o  al low f u r t h e r  c o r r e c t i v e  ac t i on .  (RR-1.1.008) (5 -19) 
Procedures s h a l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  backing o f f  the  o r b i t e r  from 
an upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  i nadve r t en t l y  separa ted  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay wi thout  con tac t  of the  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  w i th  
o r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r e  o r  equipment whi le  i n  o r b i t .  (RR-1.1.008) (5.20) 
Emergency procedures s h a l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  release, handl ing,  
and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of remotely c o n t r o l l e d  cargo i n  t h e  event  o f  
f a i l u r e  of  t h e  handl ing mechanism, o r  o f  damage t o  t h e  packaging 
o f  t h e  cargo. (GP-l.gg, 1.3.002) 
The planned a t t i t u d e s  of the  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  dur ing  release 
and s e p a r a t i o n  from the  o r b i t e r  s h a l l  be such t h a t  t h e  a t t i t u d e  
con t ro l  engines a t  no t i m e  accelerate the  veh i c l e  towards t h e  
o r b i t e r .  (GR-1.1.009) 
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Orb i t e r  s h a l l  be  moved away from upper s t age  vehicle  immediately 
on r e l ea se .  (RR-1.1. 009) 
Upper s t a g e  veh ic le  a t t i t u d e  and t r a n s l a t i o n  s h a l l  be monitored 
by the  o r b i t e r  crew immediately following r e l ea se  (RR-1.1.009) 
Upper s t age  veh ic le  a t t i t u d e  s h a l l  be cont ro l led  by comnand of 
the  o r b i t e r  crew immediately following r e l ea se .  (RR-1.1.009) 
I n t e r n a l  a t t i t u d e  cont ro l  s i g n a l  of the  upper s t age  veh ic le  s h a l l  
be monitored f o r  accuracy by the  o r b i t e r  crew before  r e l ea se  
(RP-1 . 1.009) 
Upper s t a g e  veh ic le  s h a l l  be  switched from command cont ro l  t o  
i n t e r n a l  a t t i t u d e  con t ro l  a f t e r  o r b i t e r  has been s u f f i c i e n t l y  
moved t h a t  no a t t i t u d e  change could r e s u l t  i n  c o l l i s i o n .  
(RP-1.1. 009) 
Upper s t age  veh ic le  s h a l l  be  switched from command cont ro l  by 
the  o r b i t e r  crew t o  i n t e r n a l  t r a n s l a t i o n  cont ro l  when s u f f i c i e n t  
t i m e  is ava i l ab l e  f o r  t he  o r b i t e r  crew t o  execute evasive 
maneuvers following any main propulsion o r  guidance f a i l u r e .  
(RR-1.1.009) 
The t r a j e c t o r i e s  of the  o r b i t e r  and t h e  upper s t a g e  veh ic le  
s h a l l  be cont inual ly  compared following r e l ea se ,  and a means 
f o r  shu t t i ng  down the  upper s t age  veh ic le  s h a l l  be provided 
i f  a c o l l i s i o n  appears imminent. (RR-1.1.009) 
Spec ia l  o r b i t e r  a t t i t u d e  and t r a n s l a t i o n  motions s h a l l  be planned 
t o  a s s i s t  r e l ea se  of any s i n g l e  r e s idua l  connection with  t he  
upper s t age  vehicle .  (GR-1.1.010) (5.4) 
Procedures s h a l l  be  ava i i ab l e  f ~ r  extra-vehicular  inspec t ion  
and r e l ea se  o r  re-attachment of p a r t i a l l y  re leased upper s t a g e  
veh ic les  i n  o r b i t .  (RR-1.X, 1.1.010) (5.4) 
Dumping of p rope l l an t s  and pressurants  from a r e t r i eved  upper 
s t a g e  veh ic le  s h a l l  be  accomplished before  i n i t i a t i o n  of the  
s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  deorb i t  maneuver. (RP-1.1.013) 
Dumping of p rope l lan ts  and pressuran ts  from a r e t r i eved  upper 
s t a g e  veh ic le  s h a l l  be  cont ro l led  by the  o r b i t e r  crew. (RP-1.1.013) 
An upper s t age  veh ic le  i n  which propel lant  and pressuran ts  have 
no t  been dumped s h a l l  not  be re turned i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  cargo 
bay. (RR-1.1.013) 
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S u f f i c i e n t  p rope l l an t s  f o r  o r b i t e r  dc-orbi t  and landing wi th  
on-board, f u l l y  ioaded upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  s h a l l  b e  r e t a l n e d  
on the  o r b i t e r  u n t i l  main engine i g n i t i o n  of the  upper s t a g e  
veh i c l e .  (RR-1.1.014) (5.7) 
Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  provided f o r  v i s u a l  inspec t ion  of an o r b i t e r  
payload be fo r e  i n i t i  n t i ng  r e  t r i e v n l  and loading i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay. (RP-1.1.015) 
Procedures s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  e x t r a v e h i c l u l a r  o r  remote 
i n spec t i on ,  ex tens ion ,  and r e l e a s e  o r  r e -pos i t ion ing  of  improperly 
stowed upper s t a g e  veh i c l e s  i n  o r b i t .  (RR-1.1.015) 
Procedures s h a l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  innnediately i n i t i a t i n g  opening 
of the  cargo bay doors i f  a  f i r e  is  de t ec t ed  i n  t h e  cargo bay 
whi le  the  doors a r e  s h u t .  (RR-1.2.002) (5 . l o )  
Emergency procedures s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  r e l e a s ing  cargo 
which has  become jammed i n  ha tches  o r  o the r  r e s t r i c t e d  a r ea s  
wi thout  causing damage t o  t h e  s ~ a c e c r a f t  s t r u c t u r e  o r  equipment. 
(RR-1.3.004) (5 -21) 
Manual handl ing and t r a n s f e r  of hazardous f l u i d s  o r  ma t e r i a l s  
s h a l l  be  c a r r i e d  ou t  by two o r  more personnel  who s h a l l  have 
no o t h e r  d u t i e s  dur ing  t h i s  opera t ion .  (RP-l.u, 1.3.001) 
Hand-carried cargo s h a l l  be l im i t ed  t o  45 kg (100 l b )  mass, 
provided the  cen t e r  of mass is  w i th in  35 cm (14 i n )  of 
t h e  handhold. Cargo which exceeds t h e s e  limits s h a l l  be  t r an s -  
por ted  wi th  mechanical assist. (RP-l.y, 1.3.001) 
Cargo i n  which a rup tu re  o r  leakage through t h e  con ta ine rs  
would r e s u l t  i n  uncontrol led  motion of  the  cargo because of 
p ropu ls ive  fo r ce s  beyond a s i n g l e  man's c a p a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r o l ,  
o r  because t o x i c i t y  r e q u i r e s  immediate abandonment and evacua- 
t i o n  o f  t he  a r e a , s h a l l  no t  be hand-carried. (GR-1. z ,  1.3.001) 
The t r a n s f e r  of cargo wi th  mechanical a s s i s t  s h a l l  e i t h e r  be 
v i s u a l l y  monitored by personnel  who a r e  f r e e  of  o t h e r  d u t i e s ,  
o r  s h a l l  be  provided wi th  sens ing  devices  which au tomat ica l ly  
s t o p  t he  motion i f  +he cargo i n t e r f a c e s  wi th  s t r u c t u r e  o r  
equipment. (RP-l.ee, 1.3.002) 
Personnel  s h a l l  no t  be l oca t ed  dur ing cargo t r a n s f e r  i n  p o s i t i o n s  
which can r e s u l t  i n  t h e i r  entrapment i f  t h e  cargo t r a n s f e r  
mechanism f a i l s .  (RR-1. f f  , 1.3.002) 
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3.4034 Maneuvering procedures during docking s h a l l  preclude d i r e c t i n g  sun- 
l i g h t  i n t o  con t ro l l i ng  crew's eyes o r  i n t o  the  vidicon tubes of t he  
v i s u a l  system. (RP-2.1.001) 
3 . 4 . 3 5  The pressures  on each s i d e  of a hatch s h a l l  be v e r i f i e d  before  open- 
i ng  t h t  hatch. (RP-2.1.010) 
3.4.36 Personnel w i l l  only be t r ans fe r r ed  between the  o r b i t e r  and t h e  
s t a t i o n  through a r i g i d l y  connected docking i n t e r f a c e  between the  
two vehic les .  (RR-2.4.003) 
On-Board Su rv ivab i l i t y  
3.4.37 On o r b i t e r  missions without a t tached manned s o r t i e  modules i n  
which EVA is planned as p a r t  of the  normal mission, p ressure  
s u i t s  s h a l l  be ca r r i ed  f o r  a l l  on-board personnel.  (RR-3.K, 3 .l. 009) 
3.4.38 The o r b i t e r  crew s h a l l  no t  e n t e r  manned s o r t i e  modules during 
the  conduct of hazardous experiments. (RR-3.1.002) 
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3.5 RESIDUAL HAZARDS 
Accep tab i e  
Risk 
-
Explosion/rupture of a pressur ized 
container  in an upper s t age  u - h i c l e  
i n s i d e  or  near s h u t t l e .  (1.1.001) 
Combination of mutually r eac t ive  
upper s t age  vehicle  f l u i d s  ir, 
explosion o r  f i r e  i n s i d e  o r  near  
s h u t t l e  . (1.1.002) 
Rapid decomposition of monopropell- 
a n t s  located i n  o r  leaking from the  
upper s t age  veh ic le  while i n s ide  o r  
near  s h u t t l e .  (1.1.004) 
Leakage of corrosive  f l u i d s  from 
upper s t age  veh ic le  tanks while 
i n s ide  the o r b i t e r .  (1.1.006) 
Inadver tent  s t a r t  of an upper s t age  
veh ic le  rocket  engine while i n s ide  
s h u t t l e  cargo hay. (1.1.007) 
Inadver tent  separa t ion  of any p a r t  
of upper s t a g e  veh ic le  while 
at  tachc d t o  the  s h u t t l e .  ( l . l .008) 
Loss of a t t i t u d c l t r a n s l a t i o n  cont ro l  
of upper s t age  veh ic le  upon r e l e a s e  
from s h u t t l e .  (1.1.009) 
Rupture of common bulkhead tab i n  
upper s t a g e  veh ic les  whfle in o r  
neer s h u t t l e .  (1.1.011) 
Loss of p re s su r i za t ion  i n  p ressure  
s t a b i l i z e d  upper s t a g e  vehicle .  
(1.1.012) 
I n a b i l i t y  t o  c lose  cargo bay doors 
a i t e r  r e t r i e v a l  of uppcr s t a g e  veh ic le  
because of i n t e r f e r ence  with upper 
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I s sue s  
Exposure of t h e  s h u t t l e  crew o r  
passengers t o  a t o x i c  environment 
r e l e a sed  from a vesse l  i n  the payload 
con ta in ing  a t o x i c  f l u i d .  (1.2.001) 
A f i r e  i n  t h e  cargo bay r e s u l t i n g  from 
r e l e a s e  and i g n i t i o n  of a flammable 
f l u i d  i n  an unpressur ized payload. 
(1.2.002) 
A f i r e  i n  a p ressur ized  payload i n  t h e  
cargo bay r e s u l t i n g  from r e l e a s e  and 
i g n i t i o n  of a flammable f l u i d .  (1.2,003: 
A co r ro s ive  environment i n  t he  s h u t t l e  
cargo bay r e s u l t i n g  from leakage o r  
rup tu re  of a payload v e s s e l  con ta in ing  
a co r ro s ive  f l u i d .  (1.2.<34) 
An exp los ien  i n  t he  s h u t t l e  cargo bay 
of a p o t e n t i a l l y  explos ive  payload 
ve s se l .  (1.2.005) 
S p i l l a g e  o r  leakage of  hazardous f l u i d  
o r  m a t e r i a l  dur ing manual t r a n s f e r  i n  
p r e s su r i z ed  modules. (1.3.001) 
S p i l l a g e  o r  leakage o r  hazardous f l u i d s  
o r  ma t e r i a l s  dur ing  mechanically a s s i s  t e ~  
cr remote t r a n s f e r  i n  p r e s su r i z ed  module! 
S p i l l a g e  o r  leakage of  hazardous f l u i d  or1 
m a t e r i a l  dur ing remote t r a n s f e r  i n  unpress- 
u r i zed  a r ea .  (1.3.003) 
A r a d i o a c t i v e  environment i n  a s o r t i e  
module o r  space  s t a t i o n ,  r e s u l t i n g  from 
exposme o r  escape o r  r ad ioac t i ve  mater- 
i a l  dur ing  t r a n s f e r  and handl ing of 
r ad ioac t i ve  m a t e r i a l s ,  (1.3.005) 
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Loss of veh i c l e  con t ro l  p r i o r  t o  
docking con tac t .  
Loss of veh i c l e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  
i n i t i a l  con tac t .  
Loss of docking system func t ion  
o r  con t ro l .  
F a i l u r e  of o r b i t e r  payload module 
deployment mechanism. 
Loss of veh i c l e  con t ro l  i n  c l o se  
proximity t o  o the r  veh ic le .  
Loss of veh i c l e  con t ro l  p r i o r  t o  
docking con tac t  by extendable 
tunnel .  
Loss of veh i c l e  con t ro l  a f t e r  
capture  by extendable tunnel  
docking system. 
Loss of veh i c l e  con t ro l  p r i o r  t o  
cap tu re  by manipulator .  
Loss of veh i c l e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  
ca7 tu re  by manipulator .  
Loss of manipulator  j o i n t  motor 
con t ro l .  
Loss of Communications /Command 
c a p a b i l i t y  dur ing  docking by 
unmanned f r e e  f l y i n g  module. 
Loss of propuls ion o r  c o n t r o l  
c a p a b i l i t y  dur ing  docking by 
manned f r e e  f l y i n g  module. 
Loss of l i f e  suppor t  c a p a b i l i t y  
dur ing  docking by manned f r e e  
f l y i n g  module. 
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4.0 INTERFACE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
This section contains interface safety requirements and guidelines 
required by the shuttle orbiter to  be applied on interfacing vehicles. 
These interface requirements and guidelines were developed from analyses 
of spec i f i c  safety i ssues ,  and are grouped i n  t h i s  sect ion by interfacing 
vehicle ,  as follows : 
4 . 1  Space Station 
4 , 2  Upper Stage Vehicles 
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Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  r e l i e v e  atmospheric  p ressure  
from an o r b i t e r  payload s o  as t o  prevent  p r e s s u r i z a t j c n  beyond 
the  payload s t r u c t u r  11 l i m i t s .  Th i s  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be auto- 
ma t i c  when the  payload is no t  manned, and under c o n t r o l  of the  
m c u p a n t s  when manned. The maximum dump r a t e  s h a l l  no t  exceed 
t h e  ven t ing  c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay wi th  t h e  cargo 
bay doors c losed .  (RR-1.2.003) 
Access f o r  v i s u a l  i n s p e c t i o n  by i n t r a v e h i c u l a r  a c t i v i t v  o r  
remotely by ins t rumenta t ion  s h a l l  b2 provided t o  a l l  primary 
s t r u z t u r e  of p r e s s u r i z e d  payloads whi le  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo 
bay. (GR-1.2.004) 
~ h c  f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  of p r e s s u r e  v e s s e l s  whi le  i n  o r  nea r  
t h e  o r b i t e r  s h a l l  be  a t  l e a s t  e q u a l  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  tank 
f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y .  (GP-1.2 . 005) 
Re l i e f  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  provided f o r  p ressur ized  tanks  
which au tomat ica l lv  l i m i t  maximum pressure .  Venting s h a l l  
be t o  space  o r  t o  a tank a t  lower p r e s s u r e ,  and s h a l l  be 
arranged s o  t h a t  mutual ly  r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  cannot mix and 
r e s u l t  i n  a f i r e  o r  e:cplosion. (RP-1.2.005) 
C a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided t o  de tec t ,  p o t e n t i a l  tank f a i l u r e s  
by measurement of f l u i d  p ressureo ,  tempera tures ,  tank s t r a i n s ,  
o r  o t h e r  means. (RP-1.F, 1.1.001) 
P r e s s u r i z e d  tanks b h a l l  b e  l o c a t e d  o r  provided wi th  sh rapne l  
proof b a r r i e r s  s o  t h a t  o r b i t e r  crew and passenger compartments 
and equipment r e q u i r e d  f o r  o r b i t e r  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  w i l l  be  
p r o t e c t e d  i n  t h e  el-ent of a tank explos ion .  (RR-1.2.005) 
C a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided t o  r a p i d l y  evacuate  personnel  from 
and s e a l  o f f  r a d i o a c t i v e l y  contaminated modules u n t i l  they 
can be  re tu rned  t o  e a r t h .  (RR-1.3.005) 
Means s h a l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  decontaminat ing equipment and 
personnel  exposed t o  raGioact ive  m a t e r i a l  and f o r  s t o r i n g  
and r e t u r n i n g  t o  e a r t h  r a d i o a c t i v e l y  contaminated c l o t h i n g  
and o t h e r  m a t e r i a l .  (RR-1.3.005) 
Docking 
Thermal p r o t e c t i o n  s h a l l  be provided t o  prevent  jet plume impingement 
damage from docking v e h i c l e s  w i t h i n  t h e  des ign  angular  and l i n e a r  
misalignments . (RR-2.1.004) 
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On4oard  S u r v i v a b i l i t y  
- 
4.1.10 Personnel  s h a l l  not be allowed i n  a s o r t i e  o r  space s t a t i o n  module 
dur ing  r epos i t i on ing  of the  module from one docking p o r t  t o  
another .  (RR-3.1.006) 
4.1.11 Manned s o r t i e  modules and space s t a t i o n  modules s h a l l  be designed 
s o  t h a t  they can be undocked, r e t r i e v e d  i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  cargo 
bay and re tu rned  t o  e a r t h  unpressur i red .  (GR-3.1 .OO7) 
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5.2 UPPER STAGE VEHICLE 
Hazardous Payloads -
4.2.1 Upper s t age  veh i c l e  p ressures  s h a l l  be l i m i t e d  while  i n  o r  nea r  
the  s h u t t l e  such t h a t  t h e  f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  a r e  a t  l e a s t  
equal t o  the  s h u t t l e  tank f a c t o r s  e f  s a f e t y .  (GP-LA, 1.1.001) 
4.2.2 Gaseous content  of upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  tanks s h a l l  be smal l  
enough s o  t h a t  r ap id  i s e n t r o p i c  expansion i n t o  the  s h u t t l e  
curgo bay w i l l  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  overpressure .  (GR-1.B, 1.1.001) 
4.2.3 Tanks s h a l l  be designed s o  t h a t  f a i l u r e  due t o  overpressure  
w i l l  pot produce shrapnel .  (GR-1.C, 1.1=001) (5 -22) 
k.2..i Rel ief  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  the  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  
tanks which automat ica l ly  l i m i t  maximum pressure .  Venting s h a l l  
be t o  space o r  t o  a tank a t  lower p r e s su re ,  and s h a l l  be arranged 
s o  t h a t  mutually r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  cannot mix and r e s u l t  i n  a f i r e  
o r  explosion.  (RP-1. D, 1.1.001) 
4.2.5 Housings of explos ive  charges s h a l l  be designed t o  prevent  damage 
t o  equipment requ i red  f o r  s h u t t l e  a b o r t  i n  t he  event  of inadver t -  
e n t  de tonat ion.  (RP-1.1.003) 
4.2.6 Destruct  charges s h a l l  no t  be incorpora ted  i n  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e s  
when launched i n  the  s h u t t l e .  (W-1.1.003) 
4.2.7 Prope l l an t  shut-of f  va lves  upstream from a l l  start va lves  s h a l l  
be provided s o  t h a t  inadver ten t  main valve  opening would no t  
s t a r t  engines on upper s t a g e  veh i c l e s  whi le  i n  o r  nea r  t h e  
o r b i t e r .  (RP-1.1.007) 
4.2.8 The design of t he  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  system s h a l l  only 
allow supply of e l e c t r i c a l  energy t o  t h e  s:art va lves  of  t h e  
rocke t  engines fol lowing p o s i t i v e  a c t i o n  by the  o r b i t e r  crew 
during upper s t a g e  vehic1.e count-down i n  o r b i t .  (RP-1.1.007) 
4.2.9 The design of t h e  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  c o n t r o l  system s h a l l  
only  allow supply of  e l e c t r i c a l  energy t o  the  s epa ra t i on  mech- 
anism fol lowing p o s i t i v e  a c t i o n  by t h e  o r b i t e r  crew dur ing  
upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  count-down i n  o r b i t .  (RP-1.1.008) 
4.2.10 A l l  vent ing of t he  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e s  whi le  nea r  t he  o r b i t e r  
s h a l l  be  non-propulsive o r  s h a l l  t r a n s l a t e  t h e  veh i c l e  away 
from the  o r b i t e r .  (RP-1.1.009) 
4.2.11 The c a ~ a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided on upper s t a g e  veh i c l e s  f o r  
remote emergency f e t t i s o n i n g  o f  deployable equipment t o  al low 
r e t r i e v a l  and strwage i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay. (GP-1.1.015) 
4.3 SORTIE PAYLOADS 
Hazardous Payloads 
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Access f o r  v i s u a l  inspec t ion  by i n t r a v e h i c u l a r  a c t i v i t y  o r  
remotely by ins t rumenta t ion  s h a l l  be provided t o  a l l  p r i m a ~ y  
s t r u c t u r e  d f  pressur ized  payloads whi le  i n  t he  o r b i t e r  cargo 
bay. (GR-1.2.004) 
The f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  o f  p ressure  ve s se l s  whi le  i n  o r  nea r  
the o r b i t e r  s h a l l  be  a t  least equa l  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  tank 
f a c t o r s  of  s a f e t y .  (GP-1.2.005) 
Re l ie f  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  p ressur ized  tanks which 
au tomat ica l ly  l i m i t  maximum pressure .  Venting s h a l l  be t o  
space o r  t o  a tank a t  lower p r e s su re ,  and s h a l l  be arranged 
s o  t h a t  mctual ly  r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  cannot mix and r e s u l t  i n  a 
f i r e  o r  explosion.  (RP-1.2.905) 
Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided t o  d e t e c t  p o t e n t i a l  tank f a i l u r e s  
by measurement of f l u i d  p r e s su re s ,  temperatures,  tank s t r a i n s ,  
o r  o t h e r  means. (RP-1.F, 1.1001) 
Pressur ized  tanks s h a l l  be  loca ted  o r  provided with sh r apne l  
proof b a r r i e r s  s o  t h a t  o r b i t e r  crew and passenger compartments 
and equipment requ i red  f o r  o r b i t e r  r e t x n  t o  e a r t h  w i l l  be 
p ro t ec t ed  i n  t h e  event  of a tank explosion.  (RR-1.2.005) 
Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided t o  r ap id ly  evacuate personnel  
from and s e a l  o f f  r ad ioac t i ve ly  contaminated modules u n t i l  
they can be re tu rned  t o  e a r t h .  (a-1.3.005) 
Means s h a l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  decontaminating equipment and 
personnel  exposed t o  xad loac t ive  material and f o r  s t o r i n g  and 
r e tu rn ing  t o  e a r t h  r ad ioac t i ve ly  contaminated c lo th ing  and 
o t h e r  ma t e r i a l .  (RR-1.3.005) 
Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  b e  p ~ o v i d e d  t o  r e l i e v e  atmospheric p r e s su re  from 
an o r b i t e r  payload s o  as co p revea t  p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  beyond t he  
payload s t r u c t u r a l  l i m i t s .  Th i s  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  ac tomat ic  
when t h e  payload is not  manned, and under c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  occupants 
when riinned. The maximum dump rate s h a l l  n o t  exceed t h e  ven t ing  
c a p a b i l i t y  o f  t he  o r b i t e r  cargo bay wi th  the  cargo bay doors 
closed.  (RR-1.2.003) 
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On-Board Surv ivab i l i t y  
4.3.9 Emergency capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided on manned s o r t i e  modules 
f o r  the  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  of a l l  the  passengers i n  t he  s o r t i e  
module, without l i f e  support  from the  o r b i t e r .  (GR-~.H, 1.1.001) 
4.3.10 The o r b i t e r  crew s h a l l  not  e n t e r  manned s o r t i e  modules during 
the  conduct of hazardous experiments. (RR-3.1.002) 
4.3,11 Pressure  s u i t s  and a t tendant  l i f s  support  s h a l l  be provided f o r  
a l l  o r b i t e r l s o r t i e  module passengers on missions where t he  con- 
f i gu ra t ion  does not provide two sepa ra t e  p ressur izab le  compartments 
capable of r e tu rn ing  a l l  passengers t o  ea r th .  (RR-3.1 .OO4) 
4.3,I.Z Personnel s h a l l  not  be allowed i n  a s o r t i e  o r  space s t a t i o n  module 
dur ing repos i t ion ing  of t h e  module from one docking por t  t o  another. 
(RR-3.1.006) 
4.3.13 Manned s o r t i e  modules and space s t a t i o n  modules s h a l l  be  designed 
s o  t h a t  they can be undocked, r e t r i eved  i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  cargo 
bay and returned t o  e a r t h  unpressurized. (GR-3.1,007) 
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5.0 RATIONALE FOR REQUIREMEhTS Al4D GUIDELINES 
This s e c t i o n  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f c r  some of t h e  requirements  and 
g u i d e l i n e s .  This  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  confined t o  cases  i n  which t h e  r a t i o n a l e  may 
not  b e  obvious,  o r  where some c l a r ~ f y i n g  exp lana t ions  a r e  i n  o rde r .  The 
d i s c u s s i o n  i n  genara l  fo l lows t h e  o r d e r  of t h e  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s ,  
and r e f e r e n c e  is inade in paren theses ,  where a p p r o p r i a t e ,  t 9  s p e c i f i c  r equ i re -  
ments and guidel!. . s. 
5.1 I n  t h e  evant  c "  a c c i d e n t s  which cause  some damage t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  
b u t  which leave  t h e  0asi.c s t r u c t u r e  and r e e n t r y  c a p a b i l i t y  i n t a c t ,  
t h e  eqcipment r equ i red  f o r  a b o r t  should be s u i t a b l y  p ro tec ted .  
The l e v e l  of p r o t e c t i o n  w i l l  be determinad by t h e  l e v z l  of 
t o l e r a n c e  of t h e  primary s t r u c t u r e  t o  b l a s t ,  h e a t ,  e t c .  I n  
determining t h i s  requirement ,  rescue  of t h e  crew and passengers  
by another  s h u t t l e  was not  considered accep tab le  a s  t h e  only 
means f o r  safeguarding personnel .  (3.1.1, 3.1.4, 3.2.2) 
5.2 I n  s i z i n g  t h e  o r b i t e r  always-open v e n t s  I n  t h e  cargo bay, con- 
s i d e r a t i o n  must be g iven no t  only t o  cargo bay atmospheric 
ven t ing  dur ing  boost  and r e e n t r y ,  bu t  a l s o  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
of o r b i t e r  payload k a k a g e .  A "worst case" leakage  f  l g u r e  
must b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  each payload. During boost  and 
r e e n t r y  t h e s e  requirements  w i l l  b e  a d d i t i v e  t o  t h e  cargo bay 
atmospheric  vent ing .  However, any a d d i t i o n a l  vent ing  arrange- 
ments f o r  dea l ing  wi th  payloads must n o t  cause  excess ive  
i n g e s t i o n  of ho t  gases  dur ing  r e e n t r y .  (3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.4.2) 
5  . 3 Following a  deployment mechanism malfunct ion ,  t h e  upper s t a g e  
v e h i c l e  may be f r e e  t o  r o t a t e  about t h e  remaining a t t a c h  p o i n t s ,  
o r ,  i f  completely unat tached,  may be  r o t a t i n g  about i t s  c e n t e r  
of g r a v i t y .  Under such circumstances t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  
must n o t  c o n t a c t  t h e  o r b i t e r .  (3.1.10) 
5.4 Hangup of an  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  upon r e l e a s e  may r e q u i r e  on ly  
a small f o r c e  o r  moment t o  f r e e  t h e  v e h i c l e .  These f o r c e s  and 
moments can be a p p l i e d  by programming a p p r o p r i a t e  o r b i t e r  
a c c e l e r a t i o n s ,  and t h e  s o t e n t i a l  maneuvers should  b e  de f ined  
i n  advance. These maneuvers should s t a y  w i t h i n  s t r u c t u r a l  
c a p a b i l i t i e s  and should a l low c l e a r a n c e  of t h e  upper s t a g e  
v e h i c l e  from t h e  o r b i t e r  i n  t h e  event  of release o r  no release. 
EVA a c t i o n  is a  bckup  o p e r a t i o n  t o  t h i s .  (3.1.13, 3.4.19, 3.4.20) 
5.5 Vented gases  from t h e  cargo bay may b e  c o r r o s i v e ,  and should 
no t  t h e r e f o r e  be  allowed t o  ven t  p a s t  p r o p e l l a n t  tanks  or  
o t h e r  equipment, where they may condense and cause  cor ros ion .  
(3.1.6, 3.1.31, 3.2.2) 
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5.6 Even I f  a  p r e s s u r e  s t a b i l i z e d  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  l o s e s  i ts 
p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  and c a l l n p s e s ,  i t  is s t i l l  d e s i r a b l e  t o  r e t u r n  
t h e  v e h i c l e  t o  e a r t h  f o r  r e p a i r .  The suppor t  s t r u c t u r e  i n  
t h e  o r b i t ~ r  bay nxs t t h e r e f o r e  b e  designed f o r  t h i s  contingency. 
(3.1.15) 
I f  an a b o r t  d e c i s i o n  has  been made, s a f e t y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  on 
landing r e q u i r e  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  dump upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  
p r o p e l l a n t s  b e f o r e  landing,  and hence b e f o r e  d e o r b i t ,  t o  pre- 
c lude  dumping p r o p e l l a n t s  dur ing  r e e n t r y  (1.1.014-3). I f ,  
i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h i s  c a p a b i l i t y  is a l s o  l o s t  (perhaps a s  a  r e s u l t  
of t h e  a b o r t  cause ) ,  then t h e  o r b i t e r  must b e  capable  of de- 
o r b i t i n g ,  r e e n t e r i n g  and l and ing  wi th  a  f u l l y  loaded up 
payload (1.1.014-1, -2). Such a  c a p a b i l i t y  i s  c u r r e n t l y  
provided i n  t h e  NR o r b i t e r  des ign  a t  a  s l i g h t l y  reduced 
landing s i n k  speed and f a c t o r  of s a f e t y .  A p o t e n t i a l  s i n g l e  
cause  which could both  r e q u i r e  a b o r t  and prevent  dumping of 
upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  p r o p e l l a n t s  i s  a  mechanical f a i l u r e  of 
t h e  upper s t a g e  veh ic le - to -o rb i t e r  dump prov i s ions .  I n  some 
des igns  che dump l i n e  goes through t h e  cargo bay doors ,  and i t s  f a i l u r e  
could prevent  t h e  doors  opening ( thus  l e a d i n g  t o  a b o r t )  and 
prevent  p r o p e l l a n t  dumping. (3.1.18, 3.2.1, 3.4.24) 
5.8 Because an improperly stowed recoverab le  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  
can prevent  r e t u r n  of t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  e a r t h ,  v a r i o u s  precau- 
t i o n a r y  measures a r e  r equ i red .  A l l  of t h e s e  measures a r e  
designed t o  provide  s t e p  by s t e p  checks and o p e r a t i o n a l  f l e x i -  
b i l i t y  t o  s t o p ,  r e v e r s e  o r  a b o r t  t h e  a c t i o n .  I n  t h e  event  of 
a  major problem, t h e  used upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  would be  s a c r i -  
f i c e d  t o  save  t h e  o r b i t e r  and i ts personnel .  
5.9 It is no t  c u r r e n t l y  known whether a  f i r e  is p o s s i b l e  o r  can be  
s u s t a i n e d  i n  t h e  unpressur ized  environment of t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo 
bay. C e r t a i n l y ,  i f  t h e  f l u i d  leakage  is i n  t h e  form of d i r e c t e d  
jets, enough p r e s s u r e  could be  genera ted  where they impinge t o  
s u s t a i n  a  f i r e .  The r e l e v a n t  hazardslemergency a n a l y s i s  w a s  
based on t h e  " f a i l  s a f e t '  assumption t h a t  a f i r e  - is p o s s i b l e .  
5.10 The c u r r e n t  o r b i t e r  concepts  c a l l  f o r  t h e  cargo bay doors t o  be 
opened s h o r t l y  a f t e r  o r b i t  a t t a inment ,  as t h e  r a d i a t o r s  a r e  
i n s i d e  t h e  doors ,  and t o  b e  c losed  s h o r t l y  b e f o r e  d e o r b i t .  
When t h e  doors  a r e  open, no ven t ing  problems should a r i s e .  A 
r i s k  of o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  i n  t h e  event  of massive release of 
a  gas i s  p o s s i b l e ,  however, when t h e  cargo bay doors a r e  c losed ,  
and adequate v e n t i n g  should b e  ensured dur ing  t h a t  time. It  is 
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  v e n t s  provided f o r  boos t  and re-entry a r e  
q u i t e  adequate,  b u t  t h i s  should b e  checked f o r  each payload. 
(3.1.22, 3.4.27) 
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5.11 Thermal i n s u l a t i o n  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  r a d i a t i o n  from a  f i r e  
and t o  reduce h e a t  conduction i n t o  s t r u c t u r e  and equipment would 
c o n s ~ d ~ r a b l y  reduce t h e  hazard f r o n  a  f i r e  i n  t h e  cargo bay. 
This  is n o t  g e n e r a l l y  considered f e a s i b l e ,  however, because of 
the  weight and vol ,~me c o n s t r a i n t s ,  and is only recommended f o r  
e s s e n t i a l  ins t rumenta t ion .  (3.1.27) - -~ -- -- -- _ 
While v a r i o u s  c a p a b i l i t i e s  a r e  recommended t o  p r e s s u r i z e  and 
vent  tanks  f o r  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  wi th  common bulkheads, t h e  
p r e s s u r e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  between t h e  two tanks  must be  maintained 
w i t h i n  t h e  des ign  l i m i t s  a t  a l l  t imes. An automatic  c a p a b i l i t y  
f o r  ven t ing  t h e  tanks  so  a s  t o  mainta in  t h e  a l lowable  p r e s s u r e  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  has  been considered.  Such a  device  would be 
r e l a t i v e l y  complex, however, and would in t roduce  very hazardous 
a d d i t i o n a l  f a i l u r e  modes. This  c a p a b i l i t y  i s  t h e r e f o r e  recom- 
mended t o  be under crew c o n t r o l .  (3..2.5) 
5.13 I f  a  c o r r o s i v e  f l u i d  l e a k s  i n  t h e  cargo bay, expansion and 
evapora t ion  may cause some of t h e  f l u i d  t o  f r e e z e ,  p o s s i b l y  
a t t ached  t o  s t r u c t u r e  or  equipment. This  may remain f rozen  
u n t i l  re -ent ry  o r  landing,  when t h e  s o l i d  may mel t  and i n c r e a s e  
i ts c o r r o s i v e  a c t i o n .  Means f o r  applying h e a t  t o  any s o l i d i -  
f i e d  f l u i d s  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  r equ i red ,  poss ib ly  by I V A  o r  EVA 
personnel ,  t o  evapora te  and d i s p e r s e  t h e  f rozen  f l u i d s .  (3.2.11) 
5.14 Limi ta t ions  should be  placed on t h e  mass and i n e r t i a s  of hand- 
c a r r i e d  cargo.  The b e s t  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a  has been used, b u t  
t h e s e  l i m i t s  should be  updated i f  b e t t e r  human f a c t o r s  d a t a  
become a v a i l a b l e .  (3.2.12) 
5.15 Chemical decomposition of u n s t a b l e  chemicals can b e  d e t e c t e d  
by a  rise i n  tempera ture  and p ressure .  I f  t h i s  is d e t e c t e d ,  
t h e  f l u i d s  can be dumped overboard b e f o r e  c a t a s t r o p h i c  damage 
occurs .  (3.3.3, 3.4.5) 
5.16 Some f l u i d s  a r e  t o x i c  i n  extremely s m a l l  concen t ra t ions .  A 
s p i l l a g e  i n  a  p r e s s u r i z e d  payload, o r  i n  t h e  cargo bay i f  EVa 
is performed, can propagate i n  smal l  b u t  t o x i c  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  
i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew o r  passenger compartment. Mean; f o r  
de termining t h a t  t h i s  has  occurred have been requ i re&.  This  
need no t  be  a  s e p a r a t e  d e t e c t i o n  system i n  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  how- 
ever .  I t  can r e l y  on measurements i n  t h e  payload, o r  measure- 
ments of leakage  of s p e c i f i c  f l u i d  v e s s e l s  i n  t h e  payload. 
(3.3.8) 
5.17 P r e s s u r i z e d  p r o p e l l a n t s  have a p o t e n t i a l  f o r  tank rupture .  
P r e s s u r i z a t i o n  should t h e r e f o r e  b e  planned f o r  t h e  latest 
t i m e  p o s s i b l e .  A t r a d e o f f  e x i s t s  h e r e  between exposing t h e  
o r b i t e r  t o  t h i s  hazard  f o r  a s h o r t  t i m e  by p r e s s u r i z i n g  
b e f o r e  r e l e a s i n g  t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e ,  and e l i m i n a t i n g  
t h e  hazard t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  e n t i r e l y  by p r e s s u r i z i n g  t h e  pro- 
p e l l a n t s  when t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  is some d i s t a n c e  away 
from t h e  o r b i t e r .  I n  t h e  latter c a s e  t h e  r i s k  is being taken 
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t h a t  a  malfunct ion  may occur which p reven t s  p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  
which may have been c o r r e c t i b l e  be fo re  r e l e a s e ,  thus l o s i n g  
t h e  mission.  On balance ,  t h e  former r i s k  was judged t o  b e  
p r e f e r a b l e .  (3.4.1) 
5-18 Various measures can b e  taken t o  prevent damage to the o r b i t e r  
i n  t h e  event  of a n  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  r e a c t i o n  c o n t r o l  engine 
malfunct ion.  The b e ~ t  c o n t r o l  of t h e  hazard,  however, is t o  
provide  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t o  s h u t  down t h e  mal- 
f u n c t i o n i n g  engines.  Minimizirg t h e  exposed a r e a  of t h e  o r b i t e r  
is  a l s o  considered a requirement .  (3.4.6, 3.4.7) 
5-19 A p o t e n t i a l  cause of damage i n  t h e  event  of a  p a r t i a l  inad- 
v e r t e n t  s e p a r a t i o n  of a payload is mechanical damage from 
unexpected motions and con tac t  wi th  s t r i ~ c t u r e .  One means of 
prevent ing  o r  minimizing such m n t a c t  is t o  ap7ly a  smal l  
"u l lage"  type  of a c c e l e r a t i o n  m t h e  o r b i t e r ,  l i n e a r  o r  angular ,  
u n t i l  t h e  payload has  " s e t t l ~ ~ ' '  i n t o  a  s t s lb le  p o s i t i o n .  While 
t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of doing t h i s  on any p a r t i c u l a r  occasion must 
b e  l e f t  t o  t h e  judgement of t h e  crew, prcc:!'.,~res f o r  doing 
t h i s  should be  worked o u t  i n  advance. ('?, .%. 8) 
5.20 S i m i l a r l y ,  procedures should  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  v a r i o u s  o t h e r  
cont ingencies .  Use of t h e  procedures w i l l  depend on a ba lanc ing  
of r i s k s  i n  any i n d i v i d u a l  s i t u a t i o n .  I f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  is 
c r i t i c a l ,  e.g., p reven t ing  r e e n t r y  of t h e  o r b i t e r ,  then t h e  
procedures w i l l  b e  used,  even i f  very r i s k y .  (3.4.9, 3.4.10) 
5.21 Jamming of cargo i n  doors ,  ha tches  o r  o t h e r  r e s t r i c t e d  a r e a s  
can r e s u l t  i n  s e v e r e  l o s s  o r  damage i f  no t  handled wi th  method 
and pa t i ence .  Procedures f o r  r e l e a s i n g  such cargo should b e  
developed ahead of  t i m e .  Cer ta in  t o o l s  o r  o t h e r  a i d s  may a l s o  
b e  found necessary  by developing t h e s e  procedures.  (3.4.28) 
5.22 The s ta te-of- the-ar t  is approaching t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  des ign  
p r e s s u r e  tanks  s o  t h a t  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  mode when overpressur ized  
does no t  produce sh rapne l .  This  can be done, f o r  example, by 
us ing  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  1 x g e  f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y ,  o r  by us ing  f i b e r -  
g l a s s  wound tanks .  Shrapnel-free tanks  would t h e r e f o r e  b e  
h igh ly  d e s i r a b l e .  Bedlause t h e r e  is s t i l l  doubt about t h e  
p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  of achieving t h i s ,  i t  is  c a l l e d  o u t  a s  a  guide- 
l i n e  r a t h e r  than a requirement.  (4.2.3) 
5.23 R e l a t i v e l y  few uses  of r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l  are c u r r e n t l y  
planned f o r  s o r t i e  and so la r -a r ray  powered space  s t a t i o n  
miss ions .  However, Atomic Energy Commission r e g u l a t i o n s  c a l l  
f o r  s t r i c t  s a f e t y  measures t o  keep c o n t r o l  of t h e  r a d i o a c t i v e  
m a t e r i a l ,  and t o  minimize t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of exposing t h e  
g e n e r a l  popu la t ion  on e s r t h  t o  e x c e s s i v e  r a d i a t i o n  a s  a  r e s u l t  
of an a c c i d e n t .  
